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Recruiting practices within the Department of Defense have received criticism 
during recent audits because of increased costs and inefficiencies. The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) reported many of the existing problems within the 
recruiting commands are caused by the goal-based recruiting systems used by the 
services. This thesis discusses management theories on goal-based systems and 
analyzes U.S. Navy recruiting data in order to identify possible explanations why 
individual recruiter productivity has declined since 1990 and why less than 20% of 
the Navy recruiting districts are achieving their assigned mission requirements. 
The author presents an alternative system, which is an incentive-based system, 
known as Production Recruiting Incentive Model (PRIME). PRIME is a mechanism 
designed to maximize market potential, provide an equitable reward program, and 
obtain important market information in order to allow for better reso~ce allocation 
decisions. PRIME is currently being prototyped by the U.S. Army recruiting 
command. The author recommends the Navy Recruiting Command adopt and 
experiment with PRIME as it is designed to allow various incentive tools to be 
incorporated within its framework. 
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A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report identified several discrepancies 
with Department of Defense (DOD) recruiting practices and provided several 
recommendations. All services were called upon to increase efficiency and reduce costs. One 
specific recommendation the report contained was an initiative to revise the recruiting goal-
based system because the current system deters recruiters from maximizing their number of 
enlistments [Ref 1, pp.2,68]. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.S. 
Navy enlisted recruiting goal-based system and propose a means to increase recruiter 
individual productivity. This thesis will focus on the shortfalls of the current goal-based 
system of assigning monthly new contract requirements and how the incentive structure fails 
to support these requirements. It will identify the advantages of using an ~temative goal 
achieving method tied to an incentive plan based on the recruiters' individual performance. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions are: Are there inefficiencies built into a goal-based 
recruiting system and could productivity among recruiters increase by using an bonus 
incentive-based recruiting system, such as, the Production Recruiting Incentive Model 
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(PRIME}? PRIME is a compensation system designed to reward recruiters equitably for their 
production levels and to assist in obtaining current and reliable field information on market 
potential. 
The secondary questions are: 
1. Are recruiters producing at their true level of potential? 
2. Does the current incentive system support the U.S. Navy's goal-based 
recruiting system? 
3. Can a system be more effective and more efficient if recruiters set their 
own goals vice having the goals set by upper management? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is limited to issues pertaining to enlisted recruiting in the U.S. Navy. It will 
not address officer accessions. · It will be divided into two parts. First, it will examine the 
current goal setting practices and how the goals are accomplished through the current 
incentive programs. Second, it will propose an alternative to the current goal-based recruiting 
system. The alternative will be a bonus incentive-based system that will enable the U.S. Navy 
to identifY true market potential and provide recruiters with an equitable payoff for their level 
of production. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Historical research data will be obtained from Commander, Navy Recruiting 
Command (CNRC) and interviews with CNRC staff personnel, area and district staff 
personnel, and U.S. Navy recruiters will be the primary means of collecting research data. 
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Recruiter production data will be reviewed through the use of descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The thesis is organized into six chapters. Following Chapter I, the introduction to the 
thesis, Chapter IT is a discussion about the command structure within the U.S. Navy recruiting 
system and other pertinent recruiting information. Also, it will discuss the incentive system 
currently in place to motivate recruiters. 
Chapter m discusses management theories and concepts which pertain to goal-based 
production systems. 
Chapter IV provides an analysis of historical productivity data. Past data on 
contracts, recruiter productivity, and mission achievements will be discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter V will discuss an alternative plan to the current system. The alternative plan 
will be based on PRIME, a payoff system, tied into an award system designed to increase 
productivity. 
Chapter VI will provide conclusions and recommendations. These are provided to 






The head of the recruiting system for the U.S. Navy is Commander, Navy Recruiting 
Command (CNRC), which is located in Arlington, Virginia. The overall responsibility of 
recruiting management, recruiting policies and procedures, and recruiting issues belongs to 
CNRC. There are four commands which directly support CNRC and they are called 
recruiting areas. Under the direct leadership of the areas, there are recruiting districts, zones, 
and then, stations. These activities are located throughout the United States of America. 
B. GOAL PLANNING 
Every year, CNRC receives their accession total from Bureau of Personnel, Accession 
Policy Division. This is the total number of accessions the U.S. Navy is allowed for the next 
fiscal year. From this figure, CNRC will run a statistical model to derive the U.S. Navy's new 
contract objective. This objective will be broken down by district. This model takes into 
consideration the current depositions, number of recruiters, unemployment, propensities to 
enlist, seasonality, population, relative wages, advertising, and several other factors. The 
output of this model is used in another model called the Total New Contract Forecast Model. 
This model takes into consideration, such constraints as, gender, high school graduate, prior 
service, minority, etc. These constraints are important and may change annually depending 
upon the U.S. Navy's priorities. The new contract objectives broken down by district are 
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summed to produce the areas' objectives. CNRC provides the areas with their objectives and 
provides a recommended district objective, as well. 
The areas provide the districts with their new contract objectives. The areas may use 
the CNRC recommended objective or may provide their own objective based on such criteria 
as the number of recruiters within the district, what the market will bare in the district, and 
the past performance of the district. 
The districts have a dBASE program called Standardized Territory Evaluation 
Analysis Management (STEAM). This program computes the recruiters allocation factor 
(RAF) for each zip code within the district based on demographics, past production, past 
production compared to other services, and AFQT. STEAM is used to develop the new 
contract objectives for zones, who in turn, provide it to the stations. [Ref.2] 
C. RECRUITERS 
Located at the recruiting stations, there are approximately 3 500 recruiters within 
CNRC. These are the personnel responsible for making contact with the public and tasked 
with meeting accession goals. If a station is not achieving their assigned monthly goals, other 
stations within the same district must offset the shortfall by producing more recruits than 
assigned. There are three different categories of recruiters. They are production recruiters, 
career force recruiters, and specialized program recruiters. 
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1. Production Recruiters 
Production recruiters are the recruiters assigned to duty at the recruiting stations. 
Their primary tasking is to enlist new recruits into the U.S. Navy. These recruiters are the 
primary source of recruiting productivity within the recruiting system. 
2. Career Force Recruiters 
Career force recruiters are enlisted personnel who are assigned to manage recruiters. 
At one time, they were most likely production recruiters and have several years of experience 
in recruiting personnel. Now, these senior enlisted personnel are full time recruiters who are 
assigned to be in charge of recrujting stations or assigned senior leadership positions within 
the recruiting system. 
3. Specialized Program Recruiters 
Specialized program recruiters are enlisted personnel who are temporarily assigned 
to recruiting duties. After recruiting duty, they return to their normal Navy job or rating. 
These enlisted personnel can either be on leave, on temporary duty, or performing some 
administrative function, such as, going to school while performing recruiting duty. [Ref.3] 
D. QUALITY AND TYPES OF RECRUITS 
There are two indicators or measures of quality in recruiting. They are the educational 
status of the recruit and the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score. The educational 
status is defined in two categories: high school diploma graduate (HSDG) and non high 
school diploma graduate (NHSDG). The other measure of quality, the AFQT, tests the 
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recruits' aptitude in four areas: work knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic 
reasoning, and numerical operations. [Ref.4, pp.6-7] 
The score achieved on the AFQT is used to produce several categories. First is the 
mental group category. If an individual scores a 50 or greater, he or she is considered to be 
in the upper mental group. If an indiVidual scores below 50, he or she is considered to be 
in the lower mental group. The other categories are known as quality cells. These are created 
when educational status is combined with the AFQT score. These quality cells are defined 
as A-cell, B-cell, C-upper cell (CU), C-lower cell (CL), and D-cell. The various educational 
status and AFQT categories are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Recruit Quality [Ref.3] 
AFQT Score Mental Group HSDG Quality Cell NHSDG Quality Cell 
93-99 I A B 
65-92 n A B 
50-64 mu A B 
31-49 lliL cu D 
24-30 NA CL D 
<24 Not Accepted 
The U.S. Navy has put a priority on recruiting quality personnel. As a result, 95% of 
all recruits must have a high school diploma and at least 62% must score above 50% on the 
AFQT [Ref.5, p.2]. In the past few years, CNRC has taken primarily quality cell A, B, and 
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CU. It is a rare exception for a quality cell CL or D to be accepted into the U.S. Navy 
[Ref.3]. These quality measures are instrumental in ensuring the U.S. Navy maintains the 
highest level of professionalism. 
E. INCENTIVES 
Over the years, the U.S. Navy has tried several programs to entice recruiters into 
achieving new contract goals. These incentive plans were designed to motivate recruiters to 
increase the quantity of recruits. There have been programs implemented to reward recruiters 
with medals, recruiting duty extensions, meritorious advancement in pay grade, certificates 
of commendation, etc. [Ref.4, pp.I0-14]. These awards were all designed to increase 
recruiter productivity by rewarding individuals for being successful. Today, there is an 
incentive system in place to reward recruiters for producing. Not only does it provide 
individual awards, but group awards are available, as well. Group or unit awards were 
developed to promote team work. As such, stations, zones, and districts are rewarded on the 
success of their team. The current award system is as follows: 
1. Unit and Individual Awards at CNRC Level 
Currently, there are several unit and individual awards within the CNRC incentive 
system. Table 21ists the recipient and corresponding awards within CNRC. [Ref.6] 
2. Unit and Individual Awards at the District Level 
Within CNRC, all the districts have an incentive system of their own. Currently, area 
commanders receive appropriated funds for the purpose of yearly conferences and awards. 
These awards are based on superior productivity by recruiters. This funding is distributed 
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Table 2. CNRC Awards Table (for Enlisted Recruiters) 
MERIT- NAV NAV LTR 
ORIOUS COMM ACH OF ROY 
UNIT AWARDS ADV MED MED COMM WEEK TROPHY 
UNIT AWARDS (NATIONAL WINNER) 
Recruiting District X 
oftheYear 
(Runner-Up) 
Enlisted Recruiting X 
District of the Year 
Overall Station X X X 
ofthe Year 
SWMEDILG Stations X X 
ofthe Year 
Most Improved X 
District of the Year 
Best District in X 
Minority_ Recruiting 
INDIVIDUAL AWARDS (NATIONAL WINNER) 
Recruiter of the Year X X X X 
Chief Recruiter X X X 
oftheYear 
Zone Supervisor X X X 
oftheYear 
Nuclear Field Recruiter X X X 
oftheYear 
INDIVIDUAL AWARDS (AREA WINNER 
Recruiter of the Year X X 
Chief Recruiter X 
oftheYear 
Zone Supervisor X 
oftheYear 
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and managed at the district level. The districts hold conferences annually for their zones and 
stations. Nonnally, the conferences are a two-day event that includes training and an awards 
banquet. Every district receives an allocated amount usually ranging from $4K to $18K per 
year per district to cover the expense of the conference which includes travel and per diem 
of the attendees. In addition, the districts receive approximately $1 OK yearly in appropriated 
funding for the procurement of trophies, watches, and/or statues. The criteria for the 
recipients of the awards are similar to that of CNRC which are listed in Table 2, such as, 
Recruiter of the Year for the District and so on. However, the awards are given on a 
monthly, quarterly, and yearly basis at the district level. [Ref7] 
3. Gold Wreath Award 
In addition to the awards listed in Table 2, CNRC established the Gold Wreath Award 
for Excellence in Recruiting program. The objective of this program is to recognize recruiters 
for their efforts to increase productivity. Even though the program awards on an individual 
basis, CNRC emphasizes teamwork and striving for excellence is a team effort. Therefore, 
recruiters should focus on teamwork to achieve their station's mission. 
Recruiters become eligible for the gold wreath award when they sign eight potential 
recruits to a contract for entry into the U.S. Navy. These eight contracts must be within a 
three consecutive month period. The first level of this award is a gold wreath to be placed 
around the recruiter's badge. The recruiting badge is received by all recruiters when they are 
assigned to duty as a recruiter and is worn on the left breast of the recruiter's uniform. Once 
the recruiter attains eight contracts, his or her three consecutive month counter starts over. 
If eight contracts are not attained by the end of the three consecutive month period, the 
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recruiter's counter for recruits returns to zero and he or she must start all over again. 
Additional awards may be earned for superior performance during subsequent three month 
period. Currently, there are forty levels to the sequence of awards [Ref.8]. Since the three 
consecutive month period may lap fiscal years (FY), this incentive system does not fully 
support CNRC's goal-based recruiting system. For example, a recruiter's three consecutive 
month period may be on September, October, and November. The recruiter has no incentive 
to put forth the level of effort to get eight recruits and receive the Gold Wreath Award by the 
end of September, which is the end of the fiscal year and the last calendar month to achieve 
mission objectives for the year. 
4. Special Duty Assignment (SDA) Pay 
To further entice recruiters to perform well, the U.S. Navy recently increased the 
recruiter SDA pay by $100 per month, not to exceed $375 per month [Ref.9]. Recruiters 
start off by receiving $275 after their first six months of recruiting duty. At the ninth month, 
recruiter SDA pay is raised to $325. At the eighteen month, the final increase of this incentive 
pay to $375 is provided. SDA is provided to all recruiters and isn't based on actual 
performance. Therefore, it is not directly tied to the productivity of the recruiter. However, 
if a recruiter fails to be productive, he or she may be released from recruiting duty and no 
longer eligible for the $375 per month. 
F. SUMMARY 
Over the years, there have been significant changes in the size of the U.S. Navy. The 
challenges of recruiting to provide for a 600-ship Navy are much different from recruiting for 
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a downsizing Navy. Nevertheless, enlisting people into the Navy is a form of production and 
in order to produce at a maximum rate, recruiters must be enticed by a worthy incentive 
system. The U.S. Navy realizes an attractive incentive package is the key to ensuring 
productivity levels meet the organizational goals. These incentives must be equitable if the 
U.S. Navy is to attain its desired manning levels now and in the future. 
13 
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m U.S. NAVY'S GOAL-BASED RECRUITING SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss management theories and concepts about goal-based 
production systems. The U.S. Navy's recruiting system can be identified as a centralized 
system which computes annual recruiting goals from a statistical model. This model was 
briefly discussed in the previous chapter. This type of production strategy contradicts 
successful human resource management concepts practiced in today' s corporate world. This 
chapter will apply management theories addressing inefficiency and ineffectiveness caused by 
goal-based systems. · 
B. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
A human resource strategy is vital to an organization's performance. The strategy 
must take into account without people, an organization cannot function. In addition, it cannot 
function ~ell without competent people, and it cannot excel without competent, motivated 
people. The bottom line is people are the backbone of any organization. Therefore, the 
success of an organization is measured by the direct output. of human performance from 
competent, motivated people [Ref.lO, p.480]. The objective of the U.S. Navy's human 
resource strategy should be to manage the recruiting system so recruiters are efficiently 
utilized. 
Today, recruiters are the best and the brightest personnel the U.S. Navy has to offer 
[Ref.8]. As stated above, this fact only allows for the U.S. Navy's recruiting system to 
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function, but motivating the best and the brightest is what will achieve excellence. Within the 
U.S. Navy's goal-based recruiting system, there is not an effective human resource strategy 
in place resulting in recruiters lacking the motivation to achieve the yearly mission levels. 
l. Risk Adverse by Nature 
Recruiters are evaluated on their ability to produce. Annually, recruiters receive a 
performance evaluation based on his or her performance during the past twelve months. It 
is paramount recruiters receive a top rated evaluation in order to increase his or her chances 
of being promoted to the next pay grade. As the military continues to downsize, the 
competition between Navy personnel eligible for promotion becomes intensified. 
If promotion is function of performance, recruiters are going to make every effort to 
achieve the standards or in this case, goals, that are expected of them. In addition to 
achieving their assigned goals, they are not going to behave in a way that would make the 
situation more difficult to achieve their assigned goals. Because of this behavior, it is correct 
to say people are risk adverse by nature. [Ref 11, p.1 0] 
Recruiters can lower the overall burden of achieving their goals by not overproducing. 
If recruiters are forced to produce at a certain level with no real benefit to achi~ve higher than 
their assigned goal, the potential for overproduction is eliminated. Under the current strategy, 
recruiters strive to achieve their assigned goals and nothing more because they are penalized 
for overproduction. If a recruiter overproduces, he or she will have an increased assigned 
goal the following year because past performance is a variable in the model used for goal 
assignments. As a result, overproducing will increase the recruiter's burden and increase his 
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or her variability in performance. Therefore, recruiters will always attempt to achieve their 
assigned goal but never try to overproduce. 
2. Counter Productive 
Goal-based systems are counterproductive. Once an assigned goal is achieved, 
recruiters will stop producing and "hip pocket" potential recruits in order to make it easier 
to achieve their assigned goal for the next month. This is not the ideal situation because "hip 
pocketed" recruits may change their minds and no longer desire to join the service in future 
months. 
One of the biggest obstacles the U.S. Navy faces is trying to decrease the time from 
the date when a recruit signs up to the actual reporting date to "boot camp." [Ref9]. The 
U.S. Navy's goal-based system encourages "hip pocketing" potential recruits, which only 
increases the time delay from the signed contract date to the report date. 
3. Ownership and Job Design 
A major factor in human resource management deals with the psychological 
components of job design. This practice focuses on how to design jobs that meet some 
minimum psychological requirements. The components of job design are: (1) Specialization, 
(2) Enlargement, (3) Enrichment, (4) Empowerment, and (5) Self-directed Teams. All 
components reflect increasing reliance on employees' contribution and increasing 
responsibility accepted by employees which are vital to the success of an organization. This 
method of job expansion will not only improve quality of work life and job satisfaction, but 
also, motivate employees to achieve organizational objectives. Job expansion coupled with 
an effective motivation and an incentive system, which rewards employees for superior 
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performance and for developing solutions to problems with the process, will give a company 
the competitive advantage. 
Hackman and Oldman have expanded on the components of job core design. They 
theorized jobs should include certain characteristics to ensure personal and work outcomes 
result in high motivation, high quality, and high satisfaction. Their research concluded jobs 
should include: 
a) Skill Variety- Workers are required to use a variety of skills and 
talents on the job. 
b) Job Identity- Workers perceive the job as a whole and recognize all 
the steps in the process to produce an end product. 
c) Job Significance- Workers feel they are part of the process and 
their job has an impact on the end product. 
d) Autonomy - Workers should feel independent and allowed to use 
discretion. 
e) Feedback- The process should contain a loop that provides clear, 
timely information about performance. [Ref 10, pp.485-486] 
The goal-based system does promote skill variety, job identity, job significance, and 
feedback; however, it doesn't provide autonomy to the recruiter. As a result, recruiters are 
hot given ownership of the process. In addition, it doesn't allow for job expansion which 
negatively impacts the recruiter's job satisfaction resulting in underachieved organizational 
goals. Under the goal-based strategy, goals are dictated from higher levels of management 
to recruiters. Recruiters are not consulted with or encouraged to improve the process. They 
are only there to achieve a directed mission requirement. As a result, there is no autonomy 
for "deck plate" personnel. 
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4. Working Environment 
The Hawthorne experiment of the 1920's provided one of the most famous behavioral 
research efforts of all time. After 3 years of conducting experiments, the study concluded it 
was impossible to change one condition or environmental factor without at the same time 
affecting other variables. The bottom line was employee motivation and work group morale 
seemed to be the only crucial factors. Further studies determined productivity was directly 
related to supervisor interest in the work group, no coercion for productivity improvement, 
and worker participation in changes to the process. [Ref.12, pp.44-45] 
This triad is not evident in the U.S. Navy's goal-based recruiting system. In addition, 
negative effects in the working environment are created because recruiters are pressured to 
produce at a certain level and this disallows a cohesive workplace. The pressure and stress 
to achieve assigned goals establishes the thought the recruiters' well being is secondary to the 
processing of a recruit. 
C. SUMMARY 
Today's management philosophies and successful corporations with the competitive 
advantage do not subscribe to goal-based production concepts. A human resources strategy 
based on mutual commitment and trust from "top to bottom" which includes management's 
genuine respect for the recruiters and their contributions to the system can result in an 
efficient, effective system where recruiters have optimum job design. This strategy will give 
recruiters more autonomy, create a better working environment, reduce the stress felt by 
recruiters to achieve missions, instill job enrichment factors, maximize true market potential, 
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entice overproduction, eliminate "hip pocketing," reward recruiters equitably, and provide 
more accurate data for resource allocation. 
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IV. IDSTORICAL DATA 
A. GENERAL 
During the period from FY 1990 to FY 1995, CNRC had made its total mission only 
four out of the last six years. Over the last two FY s, the Navy's recruiting production has 
plummeted. Throughout the course of a year, the mission changes; however, the data used 
in this analysis is the mission assigned to the districts at the end of a fiscal year. In addition, 
the data used pertains strictly to the Continental U.S. (CONUS). All data including the 
number of recruits and recruiters from Puerto Rico and the Phillippines have been omitted 
since the data would distort the overall mission and new contract figures, thus not accurately 
depicting the true production rates of the recruiters. 
1. Achieving Mission 
Analysis of production at the district level was performed to determine the success 
rate of each district. The missions assigned to the 31 CONUS districts from FY 1990 to FY 
1995 were compared to the actual new contracts obtained by the districts. The percentage 
of districts achieving their assigned mission is shown in Figure 1. Also, Figure 1 identifies 
what percentage by which CNRC had obtained of its overall mission. In FY 1990, 65% of 
the 31 districts achieved their directed mission requirements. However, in 1995, the number 
of districts achieving their directed requirement has dropped to less than 20%. The success 
rate is determined by dividing the number of contracts by the mission. This decline in the 
success rate per district has made it more difficult for CNRC to achieve the overall mission 
requirements. When CNRC achieved its mission requirements, the districts over-achieving 
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Figure 1. 
picked up the slack for those districts not making their mission. This isn't a problem when 
more than 50% of the districts are achieving beyond their mission, as shown in FY 1990 
through FY 1993; however, as the number of districts achieving mission decreases, there will 
be more pressure on the successful districts to make up for the unsuccessful districts. 
Detailed success rates per district are included in Appendix A. 
2. Productivity 
A key factor in measuring the efficiency of an organization is to analyze its output or 
productivity. Productivity improvement in an organization reflects continuous review of their 
process in order to apply changes to produce a competitive advantage. 
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Productivity is measured by dividing the total CNRC new contracts by the total 
number of recruiters. The overall productivity in CNRC has been on the decline. Figure 2 
reflects the productivity ofrecruiters from FY 1990 through 1995. The number of recruiters 
change throughout a given year because of several different reasons. In this analysis, the 
number of recruiters amount was the average number of recruiters per district during the FY. 
Productivity data at the district level is included in Appendix B. 
3. Disincentives for Overproduction 
This study examined if there is a disincentive for overproduction in the current goal-
based recruiting system. If a district would have an increase in mission assignment following 
overproduction in the previous year, there would be a disincentive for districts to 
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overproduce. This hypothesis, if proven, would reflect the effect over achievement has on 
the recruiters' behavioral patterns. As described in Chapter II, there are several variables 
affecting the outcome of CNRC's mission assignment model; such as, unemployment, 
propensities, etc. This hypothesis test would indicate whether or not, over achievement does 
contribute, in some way, to an increase in the district's assigned mission. 
Several attempts were made in testing this hypothesis. One attempt included a 
regression analysis on each districts' missions per recruiter for a given year and the districts' 
success rates for the prior year. In addition, a regression analysis was conducted on each 
districts' missions per recruiter for a given year, the districts' success rates for the prior year, 
and the districts' success rates for two years prior. These tests did not provide any 
statistically significant results. · One reason for this is due to the fact CNRC' s mission 
decreases from some fiscal years to the next fiscal year. For example, the CNRC mission in 
FY 1990 was 77,332 and in FY 1991, the CNRC mission was 65,744. Regardless of a 
district overachieving in FY 1990, its FY 1991 mission decreased because the overall mission 
of the Navy decreased significantly. · 
In order to get a more accurate picture, the CNRC average mission per recruiter per 
year was needed. This was computed by dividing the CNRC mission by the average number 
of production recruiters within CNRC. The CNRC average mission per recruiter per year 
was required to reflect the variances in total CNRC mission from year to year. For this 
analysis, input data from FY 1990 to FY 1995 was used. The CNRC average mission per 
recruiter per year was subtracted from the district's mission per recruiter per year. The 
district's mission per recruiter per year was computed by dividing the district's mission by the 
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district's average number of production recruiters. The results of subtracting the CNRC 
average mission per recruiter per year from the district's mission per recruiter per year were 
the dependent variables in the regression analysis. The independent variables were the 
districts prior year success rates. The general form of the model used was as follows: 
where: X= District's mission per recruiter per year 
Y = CNRC's average mission per recruiter per year 
Z =District's success rate 
t =year 
This regression analysis of each district proved the hypothesis over achievement by 
a district in a given year may contribute to an increase in the district's mission, in relative 
terms, for the following year. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3. 
A graphic interpretation of the effects overproduction has on a district is displayed in 
Figure 3. Relative to the change in the Navy's overall mission from year to year, 77.4% of 
the districts had an increase to their mission assignment subsequent to overproducing in the 
previous year. With a 95% confidence interval based on a sample of 5 observations per 
district (FY 1990 to FY 1995), 16% of the districts were statistically significant. None of 
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Figure 3. 
In analyzing the historical recruiting data, the current method of assigning missions 
to the districts is not effective. This is evident by the fact less than 20% of all the districts are 
achieving their assigned mission. A possible contributing factor to this unqerproduction by 
recruiters is if they overproduce in a given year, their mission, in relative terms, will likely 
increase for the following year. In our opinion, the effect of overproduction by a district 
leading to higher missions is caused by the increased pressure to produce at every level within 


































Table 3. Regression Coefficients for District Missions 
(By district from FY 90 to 95) 
Citv Coefficient Standar_d_ Error 
Boston -1.7555 6.0441 
Buffalo -14.1234 15.1734 
New York 15.2941 16.5592 
Columbus -0.0123 3.3030 
Philadelphia . 13.6355 12.9303 
Pittsburgh -11.4895 7.4978 
Michigan 8.8487 1.7456 
Montgomery 12.5638 19.3402 
Jacksonville 2.4359 15.8669 
Atlanta 0.9575 2.8589 
Cumberland -1.2613 3.5905 
Raleigh 7.1772 3.2447 
Richmond 7.0246 3.3644 
New Orleans 4.8304 0.6042 
Miami 7.0201 4.0911 
Chicago 10.8391 9.8796 
Kansas City 4.2563 5.0955 
Minneapolis 2.5207 3.6203 
Omaha 13.9136 10.1334 
Dallas 1.1825 12.0158 
Houston -12.6094 15.4224 
Indianapolis 0.7274 5.3350 
Memphis 3.8472 6.2106 
Denver 0.6145 4.5045 
Alabama 0.2908 3.2072 
Los Angeles 6.6299 11.9788 
Portland 14.4775 6.6485 
San Francisco -0.6638 8.7028 
Seattle 0.8913 11.8708 
San Diego -1.5712 2.2280 
San Antonio 4.5889 2.5131 



































V. PRODUCTION RECRUITING INCENTIVE MODEL (PRIME) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide information on PRIME and discuss the advantages of 
implementing a bonus incentive-based recruiting system. The focus of this thesis is to 
determine the effectiveness of the current system used by CNRC. Further research is required 
to determine the most effective payoff program for CNRC by taking into consideration their 
priorities. 
B. THE FREEMAN PLAN 
In the past, the Navy has experimented with several initiatives to increase recruiter 
productivity. One initiative in particular, was the Recruiter Productivity and Personnel 
Management System (RPPMS), or more commonly known as the Freeman Plan. The 
Freeman Plan was abonus incentive-based system developed in 1979 and remained in effect 
through 1989. The goal of the Freeman Plan was to increase the quality and quantity of 
recruits. By using a point accumulation system, recruiters were rewarded for individual 
productivity. The point accumulation system was based on a one year cycle and not broken 
down by months and quarters, as the current goal-based system in effect today. 
The Freeman Plan was effective when the Navy was expanding and when there wasn't 
an emphasis on high quality recruits. When the quality of recruits became the Navy's priority, 
recruiters located in the more difficult markets felt the point totals for awards were 
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out of their reach. When the rewards of a bonus incentive-based system becomes inequitable, 
the system will become ineffective. 
Studies conducted on the Freeman Plan identified areas in the plan making it 
ineffective. One theory suggested competitive systems can provide incentives to induce 
greater productivity; however, there is greater variance in productivity when the environment 
is a factor. As it relates to CNRC, the group of winners was much smaller to the relative 
number of recruiters because regions have different market potential and the inequalities of 
opportunity will result in inequalities of outcome. 
A second theory, which analyzed one of the most successful districts, suggested 
recruiters would seek high quality recruits in the early part of the cycle and settle for lower 
quality recruits during the rest of the cycle. Another pattern identified, productivity was the 
highest when recruiters became eligible for an award and productivity declined substantially 
immediately following the receipt of an award. Because of these behavioral patterns, this 
study suggested the best reward for recruiter productivity may be leisure time vice a 
materialistic item. [Ref. 4, pp. 10-13, 28-32] 
C. PRIME 
PRIME is a bonus incentive-based system was developed at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. This system was developed to maximize market potential, provide an equitable 
reward program, and obtain important market information in order to allow for better 
resource allocation decisions. 
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Under the current top-fed goal-based recruiting system, the recruiters who possess 
the best market potential knowledge play a limited role in the mission allocation process. 
PRIME is designed to reverse that flow by requiring recruiters to forecast their production 
as accurately as possible. A payoff matrix indicating points assigned for accurate predictions 
will ensure recruiters are rewarded equitable. 
The objectives of PRIME are as follows; 
1. Provides an incentive for recruiters to surpass top-fed goals, thereby 
maximize true market potential. 
2. Reward recruiters based on their work effort and their ability to forecast. 
3. Rewards recruiters equitably in the long run despite inherent regional 
market differences. 
4. Will provide, in the long run, CNRC with valuable market information 
allowing for efficient future resource reallocation to the productive 
regions. 
5. Will help reduce the tendency for recruiters to delay or hold applicants for 
future months, thereby improving market information for CNRC. 
6. Based on improved forecasting information, staff workload will be 
indirectly reduced and variance in the mission process may be minimized. 
7. The model is adjustable to reflect changing CNRC accession requirements. 
8. The model is capable of maintaining quality marks. [Ref.13, pp.28-30] 
Under an incentive-based system, such as PRIME, recruiters are not only rewarded 
for productivity but for accurately forecasting their productivity as well. An example of a 
PRIME payoff table is shown in Table 4. As stated above, the recruiter's payoff is 
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maximized when the recruiter's forecast matches his or her actual production. For example, 
if a recruiter's forecasted production is eight recruits for a given time period and he or she 
actually produces eight recruits, the payoff would be 360 points. However, if a recruiter 
forecasted other than eight recruits and produced eight recruits, then the payoff would be less 
than 360 points. Basically, if a recruiter knows he or she can produce eight recruits, there is 
no reason for the recruiter to hide information. Because of this concept, PRIME has a built-in 
'•. 
truth telling mechanism. Also, PRIME encourages higher productivity because the table is 
constructed to provide a higher payoff for additional recruits. If a recruiter's forecasted 
production is eight recruits, but the recruiter could produce nine recruits, the recruiter could 
gain 30 additional points for producing nine recruits. 
Table 4. An Example of a Prime Incentive Payoff Table 
Recruits Forecasted by Recruiter 
~ 
" 
5 R 7 R Q 10 11 1? 1~ 
3 90 70 50 30 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
4 120 130 110 90 70 50 30 20 20 20 20 
5 150 160 170 150 .130 110 90 70 50 30 20 
Actual 6 180 190 200 230 200 170 140 110 80 50 20 
Recruits 7 210 220 230 260 290 260 230 200 170 140 110 
Produced 8 240 250 260 290 320 360 330 300 270 240 210 
9 270 280 290 320 350 390 570 520 470 420 370 
10 300 310 320 350 380 420 600 670 620 570 520 
11 330 340 350 380 410 450 630 700 770 720 670 
12 360 370 380 410 440 480 660 730 800 880 830 
13 390 400 410 440 470 510 690 760 830 910 1 ooc 
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An advantage of PRIME is it can be tailored to particular needs. For instance, the 
Navy may want to provide recruiters with more incentive to produce quality recruits or 
nuclear field qualified recruits. If this is the case, an additional table with a higher payoff 
could be constructed or a multiplier can be used to provide the higher producing recruiter 
with a higher payoff to reward for selected criteria recruits. Further research conducted with 
CNRC representatives is needed in order to construct a payoff matrix with an equitable 
reward system while meeting the needs of the Navy. 
D. CURRENT STATUS OF PRIME 
The United States Army Recruiting Covunand {USAREC) operates under a goal-
based system. In general, the Army is fighting the same battle the Navy is fighting, which is 
a continuous decrease in recruiter productivity. The Army has tried several initiatives to 
increase productivity within its. recruiting command but none have met their expectations. 
Currently, one battalion (equivalent to a Navy recruiting district) is prototyping PRIME. The 
prototype time frame is for one quarter. Besides tailoring PRIME to meet the Army's 
requirements, it was decided the production period would be quarterly vice monthly. Since 
the goal-based system is on a monthly basis, this decision created a radical change within the 
USAREC structure. The decision was made on a quarterly time basis to remove some of the 
pressure recruiters receive in trying to achieve mission on a monthly basis. To date, PRIME 
has support from USAREC top level managers down to the recruiter level. Because of the 
fleXlbility with PRIME, the Navy can review the Army's version of PRIME and easily adopt 
a program to provide many benefits. 
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E. SUMMARY 
Today's Navy is one that is smaller but more advanced. In addition, the demands on 
the Navy are much greater than ever before. This has created a target of Navy recruits to be 
of the highest quality. In order to meet this requirement, a bonus incentive-based system is 
required to maximize recruiter productivity. The Freeman Plan, a bonus incentive-based 
system, failed because it had a few serious shortfalls. These shortfalls are not imbedded in 
PRIME. In addition, PRIME allows for tailoring to particular needs and requirements. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This study focused on the effectiveness and efficiencies within the US Navy recruiting 
system. Also, it has undertaken the initial research for the development ofPRIME which can 
be tailored to meet the needs of the Navy. 
As identified in the previous chapters, productivity is declining in CNRC. In the past 
two years, CNRC has failed to achieve its mission. . More alarming, less than 20% of the 
districts achieved their assigned mission in 1995. This figure is on a steady decline since 
1990, in which 60% of the districts achieved their assigned mission. 
This study discussed modern management theories and the shortfalls imbedded within 
goal-based systems. These shortfalls are created because people are risk adverse, the system 
characteristics discourage overproduction, and the system disallows sense of ownership 
among recruiters. Under a goal-based system, recruiters are actually penalized, in a sense, 
for overproduction. They are penalized by CNRC increasing, in relative terms, their assigned 
mission for the following year. 
CNRC has attempted many initiatives in the past to increase recruiter productivity and 
they continue to do so. One of their major initiatives, the Freeman Plan, fell short of 
expectations due to the inequities in the reward system and the length of the one year cycle 




Based on this study, we recommend the following: 
1. CNRC to abandon goal-based recruiting and implement the bonus incentive-
based system, PRIME. 
2. Further research is required to determine what factors should be used in the 
development of PRIME, tailored to meet the needs of the Navy. Factors to 
consider are quality of recruit, race, speciality fields, and geographical area. 
One of the major characteristics ofPRIME is its reward system is equitable. This was 
a significant flaw with the Freeman Plan. It is important a well thought-out strategy be define 
before the implementation of PRIME. The United States Army is currently prototyping 
PRIME in their northeast region of the United States. The Navy should seek "lessons 
learned" from the Army to assist in the development of PRIME and adopt a program tailored 
to the its needs. 
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APPENDIX A: Success Rate Per District 
District City 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
95N102 Boston 106.66% 114.47% 122.14% 105.10% 86.96% 76.88% 
95N103 Buffalo 100.98% 97.21% 103.44% 101.94% 92.28% 79.74% 
95N104 New York 104.41% 89.80% 98.27% 94.92% 99.43% 100.73% 
95N118 Columbus 106.14% 102.48% 96.57% 97.36% 71.64% 70.41% 
95N119 Philadelphia 96.49'/o 101.60% 102.32% 98.31% 100.26% 85.42% 
95N120 Pittsburgh 101.43% 89.52% 97.71% 84.29% 91.60% 104.58% 
95N122 Michigan 105.69'/o 100.00% 104.32% 95.58% 86.61% 63.37% 
95N310 Montgomery 105.72% 103.58% 108.61% 103.85% 101.78% 94.23% 
95N312 Jacksonville 89.83% 88.95% 96.57% 96.90% 97.50% 96.14% 
95N313 Atlanta 131.24% 127.16% 126.51% 106.34% 94.33% 92.46% 
95N314 Cumberland 104.99% 95.28% 95.90% 92.02% 71.65% 79.20% 
95N315 Raleigh 108.63% 115.77% 117.65% 100.55% 92.83% 83.89% 
95N316 Richmond 103.65% 102.51% 109.96% 97.58% 88.64% 89.72% 
95N334 New Orleans 109.45% 104.33% 107.34% 101.96% 72.58% 85.32% 
95N348 Miami 114.21% 105.82% 105.89% 103.70% 94.45% 83.72% 
95N521 Cbic~go 98.55% 94.73% 98.80% 98.13% 89.67% 91.31% 
95N527 Kansas City 98.27% 99.95% 102.73% 100.36% 83.32% 80.13% 
95N528 Minneapolis 104.04% 90.37% 88.62% 82.43% 83.44% 86.69% 
95N529 Omaha 95.63% 85.18% 99.65% 87.74% 82.16% 78.52% 
95N531 Dallas 109.89% 105.82% 100.06% 103.91% 88.14% 91.56% 
95N532 Houston 109.50% 104.22% 109.31% 117.19% 101.34% 102.52% 
95N542 Indianapolis 100.86% 92.52% 104.96% 103.21% 89.90% 77.34% 
95N547 Memphis 94.52% 94.58% 104.87% 99.22% 89.64% 85.91% 
95N825 Denver 97.96% 86.37% 107.07% 104.40% 79.16% 85.70% 
95N830 Alabama 99.89'/o 102.78% 104.90% 106.12% 86.55% 93.97% 
95N836 Los An_geles 78.12% 105.04% 105.99% 102.21% 94.16% 96.16% 
95N837 Portland 106.04% 89.38% 88.43% 100.36% 88.07% 98.32% 
95N838 San Francisco 104.53% 101.61% 92.91% 100.38% 102.54% 100.38% 
95N839 Seattle 95.89'/o 89.57% 92.95% 107.20% 86.92% 107.13% 
95N840 San Diego 94.35% 105.91% 106.64% 114.30% 112.85% 118.61% 
95N846 San Antonio 113.65% 110.42% 112.46% 96.06% 81.07% 94.96% 
* Success Rate is measured by Contracts divided by Mission. 
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APPENDIX B: District Level Productivity Data 
FY 1990 
Number of Mission per Contracts per 
District City Recruiters Recruiter Recruiter 
95N313 Atlanta 141.8 17.1 22.4 
95N531 Dallas 99.8 20.2 22.2 
95N825 Denver 89.0 22.0 21.6 
95N529 Omaha 96.0 22.4 21.4 
95N837 Portland 112.3 19.8 21.0 
95N532 Houston 113.3 19.1 20.9 
95N846 San Antonio 136.0 18.2 20.6 
95N334 New Orleans 139.5 18.8 20.6 
95N521 Chicago 140.3 20.7 20.4 
95N830 Alabama 86.8 20.4 20.3 
95N348 Miami 123.3 17.7 20.2 
95N527 Kansasq_ty 114.0 20.3 20.0 
95N122 Michigan 161.5 18.7 19.8 
95N838 San Francisco 178.5 18.7 19.5 
95N102 Boston 130.8 18.3 19.5 
95N315 Raleigh 125.3 17.9 19.4 
95N840 San Diego 117.3 20.4 19.2 
95N118 Columbus 176.0 18.1 19.2 
95N310 Montgomecy 152.3 18.0 19.1 
95N104 New York 170.0 18.2 19.0 
95N314 Cumberland 160.5 17.4 18.2 
95N316 Richmond 131.5 17.5 18.1 
95N120 Pittsburgh 139.0 17.7 17.9 
95N541 Memphis 140.8 18.7 17.7 
95N528 Minneapolis 153.0 16.7 17.4 
95N119 Philadelphia 164.0 17.5 16.9 
95N839 Seattle 133.8 17.3 16.6 
95N103 -·Buffalo - 164.5 15.5 15.6 
95N542 Indianapolis 137.3 15.2 15.3 
95N312 Jacksonville 161.8 16.7 15.0 
95N836 Los Angeles 148.0 17.1 13.4 
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FY 1991 
Number of Mission per Contracts per 
District City Recruiters Recruiter Recruiter 
95N532 Houston 107.3 19.4 20.3 
95N846 San Antonio 126.8 18.3 20.2 
95N315 Raleigh 114.0 17.4 20.1 
95N313 Atlanta 139.8 14.9 18.9 
95N348 Miami 110.5 17.3 18.3 
95N531 Dallas 99.0 17.2 18.2 
95N102 Boston 134.0 15.6 17.9 
95N830 Alabama 84.5 17.0 17.5 
95N840 San Diego 111.5 16.4 17.4 
95N527 Kansas City 110.3 17.2 17.2 
95N334 New Orleans 136.5 16.4 17.1 
95N310 Montgomery 143.0 16.0 16.6 
95N122 Michigan 159.5 16.5 16.5 
95N529 Omaha 91.8 19.4 16.5 
95N316 Richmond 122.5 15.9 16.3 
95N838 San Francisco 174.3 16.0 16.3 
95N837 Portland 104.8 18.1 16.1 
95N119 Philadelphia 153.8 15.9 16.1 
95N547 Memphis 134.5 17.0 16.1 
95Nll8 Columbus 180,0 15.4 15.8 
95N825 Denver 93.0 17.6 15.2 
95N104 New York 169.0 16.9 15.2 
95N521 Chicago 155.5 15.9 15.0 
95N314 Cumberland 150.5 15.5 14.8 
95N542 Indianapolis 121.3 15.8 14.6 
95N312 Jacksonville 152.3 15.6 13.9 
95N528 Minneapolis 145.5 15.3 13.8 
95N836 Los Angeles 132.5 13.0 13.7 
95N103 Buffalo 159.8 13.7 13.3 
95N120 Pittsburgh 128.3 14.7 13.1 
95N839 Seattle 124.3 14.0 12.6 
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FY 1992 
Number of Mission per Contracts per 
District City Recruiters Recruiter Contracts Recruiter 
95N315 Raleigh 113.5 16.5 19.4 
95N313 Atlanta 126.8 15.3 19.4 
95N846 San Antonio 127.3 17.2 19.3 
95N532 Houston 107.5 16.9 18.5 
95N542 Indianapolis 104.8 16.0 16.8 
95N527 Kansas City 107.8 16.3 16.8 
95N102 Boston 149.5 13.7 16.8 
95N547 Memphis 118.3 15.8 16.6 
95N316 Richmond 124.0 15.1 16.6 
95N531 Dallas 103.8 16.5 16.6 
95N310 Montgomery 131.5 15.1 16.4 
95N334 New0r1eans 132.3 15.2 16.4 
95N348 Miami 115.3 15.2 16.1 
95N122 Michigan 150.3 15.4 16.1 
95N830 Alabama 89.3 15.3 16.1 
95N521 Chicago 133.3 15.7 15.5 
95N825 Denver 92.0 14.5 15.5 
95N840 San Diego 120.3 14.3 15.2 
95Nll9 Philadelphia 148.5 14.8 15.2 
95N118 Columbus 166.0 15.5 15.0 
95N314 Cumberland 144.3 15.4 14.8 
95N120 Pittsburgh 115.5 14.8 14.4 
95N312 Jacksonville 148.0 14.8 14.3 
95N529 Omaha 102.3 13.8 13.8 
95N103 Buffalo 147.8 13.2 13.7 
95N838 San Francisco 173.0 14.7 13.6 
95N104 New York 179.3 13.2 13.0 
95N839 Seattle 120.8 13.8 12.8 
95N837 Portland 116.3 14.1 12.5 
95N528 Minneapolis 142.0 14.1 12.5 
95N836 Los Angeles 137.0 11.6 12.3 
41 
FY 1993 
Number of Mission per Contracts per 
District City Recruiters Recruiter Contracts Recruiter 
95N532 Houston 109.5 14.9 17.5 
95N102 Boston 119.3 16.4 17.3 
95N840 San Diego 108.8 14.0 16.0 
95N348 Miami 112.0 15.2 15.8 
95N312 Jacksonville 104.0 16.1 15.6 
95N310 Montgomery 113.0 15.0 15.5 
95N521 Chicago 98.3 15.8 15.5 
95N542 Indianapolis 95.8 15.0 15.5 
95N527 Kansas City 108.8 15.3 15.4 
95N316 Richmond 107.5 15.7 15.4 
95N119 Philadelphia 110.5 15.5 15.2 
95N334 New Orleans 123.3 14.9 15.2 
95N547 Memphis 110.8 15.1 15.0 
95N104 New York 122.5 15.8 15.0 
95N830 Alabama 83.8 14.1 14.9 
95N315 Raleigh 122.0 14.8 14.9 
95N846 San Antonio 128.0 15.3 14.7 
95N836 Los Angeles 114.8 14.2 14.5 
95N122 Michigan 129.5 15.0 14.4 
95N838 San Francisco 148.5 14.2 14.2 
95N825 Denver 97.0 13.3 13.9 
95N313 Atlanta 155.0 13.0 13.9 
95N314 Cumberland 120.8 14.9 13.8 
95N531 Dallas 111.5 12.9 13.4 
95N529 Omaha 74.0 15.2 13.4 
95N118 Columbus 151.0 13.6 13.2 
95N103 Buffalo 120.0 12.9 13.1 
95N837 Portland 115.5 12.1 12.2 
95N120 Pittsburgh 94.0 13.5 11.4 
95N839 Seattle 120.5 10.0 10.8 
95N528 Minneapolis 114.8 12.8 10.5 
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FY 1994 
Number of Mission per Contracts per 
District City Recruiters Recruiter Contracts Recruiter 
95N104 New York 95.5 20.3 20.2 
95N840 San Diego 101.3 17.5 19.7 
95N838 San Francisco 112.5 18.9 19.4 
95Nll9 Philadelphia 104.0 18.3 18.4 
95N836 Los Angeles 105.5 19.5 18.3 
95N120 Pittsburgh 71.3 18.6 17.0 
95N103 Buffalo 99.8 17.9 16.5 
95N521 Chi caBO 94.3 18.4 16.5 
95N532 Houston 105.8 16.3 16.5 
95N313 Atlanta 137.3 17.4 16.4 
95N542 Indianapolis 80.3 18.1 16.3 
95N315 Raleigh 113.3 17.5 16.2 
95N102 Boston 114.3 18.7 16.2 
95N310 Montgomery 116.5 15.9 16.2 
95N348 Miami 110.8 17.1 16.1 
95N312 Jacksonville . 100.5 16.4 15.9 
95N837 Portland 89.0 17.9 15.8 
95N547 Memphis 107.3 17.5 15.7 
95N830 Alabama 72.0 . 18.1 15.6 
95N316 Richmond 109.5 17.4 15.4 
95N122 Michigan 120.5 17.4 15.1 
95N839 Seattle 93.8 17.0 14.7 
95N846 San Antonio 110.3 18.1 14.7 
95N527 Kansas City 107.0 17.3 14.4 
95N529 Omaha 71.0 17.4 14.3 
95N825 Denver 84.0 17.9 14.2 
95N314 Cumberland 100.8 19.2 13.8 
95N531 Dallas 117.8 15.3 13.5 
95Nll8 Columbus 115.0 18.6 13.3 
95N528 Minneapolis 91.8 15.7 13.1 




Number of Mission per Contracts per 
District City Recruiters Recruiter Contracts Recruiter 
95N840 San Diego 132.0 16.4 19.4 
95N104 New York 115.0 19.0 19.1 
95N836 Los Angeles 144.8 18.2 17.5 
95N839 Seattle 89.8 16.1 17.3 
95N532 Houston 116.8 16.7 17.1 
95N837 Portland 86.0 16.6 16.3 
95N846 San Antonio 113.3 16.8 16.0 
95N838 San Francisco 148.3 15.9 16.0 
95N531 Dallas 109.3 17.0 15.6 
95N830 Alabama 84.8 16.4 15.5 
95N310 Montgomery 115.3 16.4 15.4 
95N312 Jacksonville 108.0 15.9 15.2 
95N120 Pittsburgh 86.0 14.2 14.9 
95N119 Philadelphia 122.8 17.4 14.8 
95N521 Chicago 102.0 15.9 14.5 
95N316 Richmond 118.0 16.0 14.4 
95N102 Boston 131.5 18.0 13.8 
95N313 Atlanta 152.0 14.9 13.8 
95N825 Denver 88.0 16.0 13.7 
95N547 Memphis 127.8 15.9 . 13.7 
95N528 Minneapolis 90.8 15.7 13.6 
95N103 Buffalo 113.5 17.0 13.6 
95N348 Miami 119.5 16.2 13.6 
95N315 Raleigh 125.0 15.7 13.2 
95N527 Kansas City 115.3 16.3 13.1 
95N314 Cumberland 102.5 16.5 13.1 
95N529 Omaha 77.3 16.6 13.1 
95N334 New Orleans 110.0 15.1 12.8 
95N542 Indianapolis 95.3 16.1 12.4 
95N118 Columbus 127.8 16.2 11.4 
95N122 Michigan 133.0 15.3 9.7 
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